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Abstract
States of emergency pose the most significant challenges to the safeguarding of fundamental rights and civil
liberties. Crises are generally characterized by a strengthening of the executive to the detriment of judicial
authority and parliamentary oversight. One of the immediate consequences of emergencies is the absence
of effective domestic mechanisms of supervision of the executive. The gradual replacement of the judicial
role with police operations represents a symptom of how prolonged emergencies prompt the eclipse of
legal certainty and lead to the rapid and irreversible degradation of public institutions.
This Article addresses the difficult compromise between defending national interests and protecting
individual rights during public emergencies. It analyzes the common features across the recent derogations
and exceptional measures of Ukraine, France, and Turkey. The derogations submitted by the three countries
in question, together with the exceptional measures adopted for counter-terrorism purposes, substantially
restrict several fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).
In particular, preventive detention measures, with the suspension of the habeas corpus otherwise approved
by the three States, not only enable police forces to use arbitrary and unlimited use of force, but also seriously
affect the protection of absolute and non-derogable rights. The Article concludes that, as the recent
emergency laws and their widespread and apparently indiscriminate implementation present the risk of
destabilizing the whole European system of protection, it becomes ever more necessary that the
European Court of Human Rights depart from its previous jurisprudence and adopt a more rigorous
and principled scrutiny of the derogation conditions under Article 15 of the Convention.
Keywords: state of emergency; derogation; human rights; Turkey; France; Ukraine
“C’est une expérience éternelle que tout homme
qui a du pouvoir est porté à en abuser:
il va jusqu’à ce qu’il trouve des limites : : :
Pour qu’on ne puisse abuser du pouvoir,
il faut que, par la disposition des choses,
le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir.”1
- Montesquieu, 1758
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A. Introduction
On May 21, 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted Resolution No. 462-VIII, which declared
a derogation from the European Convention of Human Rights (Convention).2 The Ukrainian
authorities held that the military intervention of Russian forces within Ukrainian territory
constituted a public emergency that threatened the life of the nation under Article 4(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 15(1) of the
Convention.3 On November 13, 2015, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks that occurred in
Paris, France submitted its own derogation to its obligations under the Convention.4 France
argued that declaring a state of emergency, together with the attending adoption of exceptional
measures, was necessary to prevent the commission of future terrorist attacks.5 On July 21, 2016,
Turkey took a similar decision by communicating a derogation from the Convention to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe.6 The decision to announce a state of emergency
was taken immediately after a failed military coup that, according to the Turkish authorities, posed
significant dangers to public security and constituted a threat to the life of the nation.7
These three scenarios place into question the applicability of fundamental rights within the
context of an alleged public emergency. Article 15 of the Convention allows the governments
of the contracting States to derogate from their obligations under the Convention during excep-
tional circumstances. Such derogation may only be carried out if it is temporary in duration,
limited in scope, and done under the supervision of the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe. Furthermore, the emergencies that trigger Article 15 necessarily involve an acute conflict
between national interests and the protection of human rights. The rationale underlying Article 15
is to strike a proper balance between a contracting State’s interest in overcoming the emergency
and safeguarding those fundamental rights that may be significantly limited in situations of crisis.
This study addresses the difficult compromise between defending national interests and pro-
tecting individual rights during public emergencies. Accordingly, this study critically assesses the
law and practice concerning the suspension of the Convention’s guarantees. In the past, Article 15
has been used almost exclusively by two countries: The United Kingdom (UK) in its relations with
North Ireland, and Turkey in its dealings with the Kurdish Separatist Movement in the south-east
region of the country.8 Even after the September 11th attack in the United States, when there
existed a concrete risk that an increasing number of States would declare a state of public emer-
gency, the UK was the only contracting State to submit a derogation of the Convention to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe.9 Although the behavior of contracting States over
the last three years suggests a general reluctance to rely on Article 15, Turkey is not the only
2Eur. Consult. Ass., Note Verbale, JJ7979C Tr./005-185 (June 10, 2015) (reporting Ukraine’s reservations from the
Convention). On June 5, 2015, Ukraine also submitted to the United Nations Secretary General its derogation from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) under Article 4(3). See Reservations and Declarations for
Treaty No.005-Conventions for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/declarations (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
3Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2.
4Eur. Consult. Ass., Note Verbale, JJ8045C Tr./005-191 (Nov. 25, 2015) (reporting France’s reservations from the
Convention). On December 3, 2015, French authorities communicated to the United Nations the French derogation from
the ICCPR.
5Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.
6Eur. Consult. Ass., Note Verbale, JJ8187C Tr./005-191 (July 22, 2016) (reporting Turkey’s reservations from the
Convention). On August 11, 2016, the United Nations published Turkey’s notification of derogation from the ICCPR.
7See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.
8With regard to the British derogation, see, inter alia, Ireland v. UK, App. No. 5310/71 (Jan. 18, 1978), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/; Brannigan andMcBride v. UK, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 (May 26, 1993), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. With respect
to Turkey, see inter alia Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93 (Dec. 18, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Demir and others v.
Turkey, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064 (Sep. 23, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Nuray Şen v. Turkey, App. No. 41478/98
(June 17, 2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Bilen c. Turqui, App. No. 34482/97 (Feb. 21, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
9See A. and others v. UK, App. No. 3455/05 (Feb. 19, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
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State that has reintroduced the state of exception.10 Other States that have submitted respective
derogations include Ukraine,11 which had never invoked Article 15 before, and France,12 whose
last and sole suspension of the Convention goes back to 1961.13
Scholarship—as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
dealing with the existence of a state of emergency—has already extensively analyzed the condi-
tions for derogation under Article 15.14 Nonetheless, the decisions of three different States to
confront alleged emergencies by relying on the derogation clause found in Article 15 of the
Convention ensure the topicality of this Article. More specifically, this study aims to further
the discussion by critically analyzing derogations from the Convention in the context of the recent
declarations of state of emergencies by Ukraine, France, and Turkey. This research assesses the
challenges that the special measures adopted by these countries pose to the European system of
protection of human rights. Section B provides a brief overview of the substantive and procedural
conditions for derogation, as interpreted and applied by the Strasbourg judges. Section C examines
contracting States’ derogations from the Convention, with a focus on the main exceptional mea-
sures entered into force by Ukraine, France, and Turkey. In this regard, the ECHR has only
addressed applications that concern the implementation of special laws in Turkey. Section D
examines the complaints as evidence of the ECHR’s formalistic approach to the initial applications
submitted after the coup in Turkey. Section E analyzes the common features across the recent
derogations and exceptional measures of Ukraine, France, and Turkey. Section F provides a gen-
eral investigation on whether and to what extent it is possible to provide a prognosis on the
ECHR’s stance with respect to contemporary emergencies. Section G, in turn, discusses how
the measures adopted by the three countries create tension with Article 5 of the Convention that
subsists even when derogation is justified. By way of conclusion, this study reflects on the limits of
the ECHR’s approach to public emergencies and emphasizes the necessity for the ECHR to depart
from its previous jurisprudence in order to ensure the integrity of the protective system as a whole.
B. Conditions for the derogation from the European system of protection of human
rights: a general overview
Like the ICCPR, the Convention recognizes the existence of emergency situations that may require
domestic authorities to take measures normally diverging from the standard human rights
protections afforded under the European system. Such deviation enables governments to over-
come temporary crises without affecting fundamental rights that do not permit any derogation.
In the interpretation and application of Article 15, European judges have held that their
10Communication from the Permanent Representation of Turkey Registered at the Secretariat General on 24 July 2016 - or.
Engl., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018). The recent derogation marks the first time that
Turkey has submitted derogations that are not formally linked to the Kurdish Separatist Movement.
11Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2.
12Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.
13Press Unit, European Court of Human Rights, Derogation in Time of Emergency (August 2018), http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/FS_Derogation_ENG.pdf.
14See inter alia, DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed. 2014); Giuseppe
Cataldi, Art. 15, in COMMENTARIO BREVE ALLA CONVENZIONE EUROPEA DEI DIRITTI DELL’UOMO 555 (Sergio Bartole et al.
eds., 2012); Jan-Peter Loof, Crisis Situations, Counter-Terrorism and Derogation from the European Convention of Human
Rights: A Threat Analysis, in MARGINS OF CONFLICT: THE ECHR AND TRANSITIONS TO AND FROM ARMED CONFLICT 35
(Antoine Buyse ed., 2010); Stefan Kirchner, Human Rights Guarantees During States of Emergency: The European
Convention on Human Rights, 3 BALTIC J.L. & POL. 1 (2010); Peter Duffy, Note on Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, in DROITS INTANGIBLES ET ETATS D’EXCEPTION 203, 206–07 (Daniel Prémont ed., 1996);
Christoph Schreuer, Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The Experience of the European
Convention on Human Rights, YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 113 (1982); Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights
Treaties in Public Emergencies – A Critique of Implementation by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, 22 HARV. INT’L. L. REV. 1 (1981).
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approaches must take into account the “need, inherent in the Convention system, for a proper
balance between the defence of the institutions of democracy in the common interest and
the protection of individual rights : : : .”15 Accordingly, Article 15 uniquely permits High
Contracting Parties to the Convention to deviate from their obligations under the Convention
if they satisfy a number of substantive and procedural conditions.
A State may take derogating measures only in time of war or some other public emergency that
threatens the life of the nation. War refers to both international and non-international armed
conflicts,16 whereas the notion of “other public emergency,” as interpreted by the Strasbourg
Court, refers to “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole popula-
tion and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is
composed : : : .”17 Furthermore, an emergency may only amount to a ground for derogation from
the Convention’s guarantees if: (1) It is current or imminent; (2) concerns the whole nation; (3)
threatens the organized life of the community; and (4) is exceptional.18 In other words, the nature
of a qualifying emergency is one which conventional legislative measures would not provide an
effective response for. In the A. and others v. UK case, the ECHR—sitting as a Grand Chamber—
rejected Lord Hoffmann’s view that a “threat to the organized life of the community” requires
more than a threat of serious physical damage and loss of life.19 The Grand Chamber held that
justifying a derogation does not require that the threat posed reach the level of imperiling the
institutions of the State.20
The ECHR has arguably delegated to governments the authority to establish whether the life of
the nation is threatened by a “public emergency” and, if so, determining the extent of measures
that are necessary to overcome the crisis.21 This deferential stance means that the Strasbourg
judges do not make their own inquiries into or evaluations of the notion of “public emergency.”
Instead, judges provide contracting States with a wide margin of discretion to ascertain for them-
selves the existence of a state of emergency under Article 15.22 In particular, the Strasbourg judges
have emphasized how “the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature
and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it.”23 On the basis of this extensive margin of
discretion, the European Commission of Human Rights and the ECHR have generally appeared
quite reluctant to challenge the validity of States submissions that concern states of emergency.24
In fact, they have thus far only rejected a national authorities’ claim of a public emergency in the
Greek case, whereby the military junta had called for a derogation from the Convention by arguing
the existence of an emergency state.25
Nevertheless, the discretion of High Contracting Parties under Article 15 is not unlimited.
The ECHR must still assess whether a State acts in a manner that exceeds the “extent strictly
required by the exigencies” of the situation. The ECHR thus retains a supervisory role over
15Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK, App. No. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86, para. 28 (Aug 30, 1990), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/.
16Cataldi, supra note 14.
17See, inter alia, Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), App. No. 332/57, para. 28 (July 1, 1961), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
18COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE GREEK CASE: REPORT TO THE SUB-COMMISSION 70 (Greek Case) (1969), Vol. I, Part I,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Denmark_v_Greece_I.pdf.
19See A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 179.
20Id. at para. 179–80.
21See Brannigan, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at para. 43; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 68; Demir, App. No. 71/1997/
855/1062–1064 at para. 43; Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207; Lawless, App. No. 332/57 at 85.
22See Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207.
23Id.
24See in particular Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nì Aolain, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS.
Q. 625 (2001).
25See GREEK CASE, supra note 18, at 18.
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the proportionality of exceptional measures, evaluating the measures based on the gravity of
the situation. Emergency measures must be both necessary and proportionate to the situation.
In A. and others v. UK, the European judges stated that the Court “is required to examine the
measures that have been adopted in derogation of the Convention rights in question and. .. weigh
them against the nature of the threat to the nation posed by the emergency.”26 In exercising its
supervision, the ECHR takes into account relevant factors including the nature of the rights
affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to the emergency situation, and the duration
of the emergency situation.27
In addition, any derogation may not conflict with the State’s other obligations under
international law.28 TheConvention prevents contracting States from adoptingmeasures that could
be justified under Article 15, but would otherwise violate other obligations that the State may have
under international law. This condition has received little attention by the Strasbourg judges so far.29
The ECHR rejected the submissions of Mr. Brannigan and Mr. McBride, who argued that the UK
had violated its obligations under international law because the national authorities had not offi-
cially proclaimed the state of emergency as required under Article 4 of the ICCPR.30
Article 15 of the Convention also provides that not all fundamental rights can be derogated.
This is true in relation to the fundamental rights mentioned in Article 15(2) and Protocols 6 and
13 of the Convention. Article 15(2) prevents States from derogating from the right to life under
Article 2, except in the context of lawful acts of war; the prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3; the prohibition of slavery and servitude
under Article 4; and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege under Article 7.
Finally, the Convention also imposes a procedural condition: The State availing itself of the
right of derogation must “keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed
of the measures it has taken. .. .”31 This condition significantly differs from the requirements
for derogation set forth in the ICCPR. Article 4(3) of the ICCPR compels any State Party to
immediately inform other contracting States about the provisions from which it has derogated.
Comparatively, Article 15 of the Convention simply requires High Contracting Parties to inform
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, without any mention of the expeditiousness or
content of such a communication.
C. The state of emergency in practice: the recent derogations before
the European Court
In the past, Albania, Armenia, France, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Turkey, and the UK have invoked
Article 15 of the Convention.32 Among these States, UK, Turkey, Greece, and Ireland are the only
countries that the European Commission of Human Rights or the ECHR have called to justify the
measures taken. The first British derogation relates to the governance of Cyprus in 1950.33 Since
the 1970s, the UK has suspended the application of the Convention several times in response to
26See A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 185.
27See, inter alia, Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207; Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89; 14554/89, para. 43;
Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 68.
28See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(1), Dec. 10, 1948, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter Convention].
29See HARRIS, supra note 14, at 844.
30See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at paras. 68–73.
31Convention art. 15(3).
32See Press Unit, supra note 13.
33See Greece v. UK, App. No. 176/56, (1959) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-
75361&filename=001-75361.pdf.
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different circumstances linked to emergency situations in Northern Ireland.34 For their part, Irish
authorities have also submitted a derogation in connection to the violence in Northern Ireland.35
In Greece, the military junta made the decision to limit the application of fundamental rights
following the coup d’état that took place in 1967.36
Turkeyhasheavily relied on thederogation clause in relation to theKurdish SeparatistMovement
operating in the southeast part of the country.37 Turkish authorities have invoked the derogation
clause for substantive periods between June 1970 and July 1987, including an especially lengthy
period that lasted from September 1980 until May 1987.38 In August 1990, Turkey, which—until
recently—had been arguing for the necessity of suspending some of the obligations under the
Convention in order to deal with the situation in the southeast region, again invoked Article 15.
Therefore, since the establishment of the European Commission of Human Rights, only
a small number of countries have invoked the derogation. Furthermore, even after the
September 11th attacks, which represented a concrete risk that several States would declare
states of public emergency, only the UK submitted a derogation to the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe.39 Nevertheless, the reluctance of States to use the derogation clause
may be dimming. This is not to say, however, that a massive proliferation of suspension requests
will follow the recent ISIS attacks throughout different European countries. As was the case after
the September 11th attack, States need not rely on the derogation clause to face terrorism
because a large number of provisions in the Convention already contain limitation clauses that
allow restrictions to the applicability of rights. The Convention already provides contracting
States with a sufficient degree of flexibility in the application of human rights standards.40
Such flexibility allows the implementation of special counter-terrorism measures that are in
line with the Convention standards and do not require the use of a state of emergency under
Article 15. Nevertheless, as the next subsection explains, declarations of emergencies appear to
be gaining more popularity among contracting States.
I. Ukraine
On May 21, 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament declared a derogation from the Convention.41 The
Ukrainian authorities argued that the military intervention of Russian forces within Ukrainian
territory constituted a public emergency under Article 4(1) of the ICCPR and Article 15(1) of
the ECHR that threatened the life of the nation.42 One year before the imposition of the state of
emergency, the Ukrainian Parliament had already amended domestic legislation on terrorism by
introducing several measures affecting the scope of the applicability of some fundamental rights
of the Convention—for example, those fundamental rights under Articles 5, 6, 8, and 13.43 The
derogation and domestic changes were justified in light of “the armed aggression of the Russian
Federation and actions of the terrorist groups backed by the Russian Federation.”44 The most
significant change introduced by the legislation adopted in the aftermath of theRussian intervention
34See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at paras. 30–32.
35See Lawless, App. No. 332/57 at para. 17.
36See Greek Case, supra note 18.
37See Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at paras. 8–9, 31.
38See Gross & Nì Aolain, supra note 24, at 646.
39See A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 103.
40Colin Warbrick, The Principles of the ECHR and the Response of States to Terrorism, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 311
(2002).
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was the extension of the maximum duration of preventive detention of alleged terrorists from
72 hours to 30 days.45 According to the amendments to the Law on Combating Terrorism, a pros-
ecutor may decide to limit personal liberty for a period of 30 days without any authorization from a
competent judicial authority.46
The Parliament also amended the Code of Criminal Procedure by introducing a special regime
of pre-trial investigation under martial law during states of emergency or in the anti-terrorist
operation area. Prosecutors have been provided with the authority to issue decisions, that are
normally attributed to investigating judges, relating to custodial measures, access of property,
searches, and wiretapping.47 Within the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, further exceptional
measures issued since 2014 have also entrusted military and civil administrations with the power
to restrict freedom of movement by imposing curfews and the power to conduct security searches,
checks, and other measures to allegedly protect public safety.48 Finally, the Parliament has also
modified the territorial jurisdiction of court cases and investigative jurisdiction for criminal
offenses committed in the anti-terrorist area.49
II. France
On November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks occurred in Paris, where 130 peo-
ple were killed and 413 were injured.50 In the aftermath of these attacks, France decided to apply
Law 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency, which had initially been adopted in the
Algerian situation.51 The fundamental rights significantly affected by the exceptional measures
can only be derived from reading the text of the law and its amendments because the derogation
does not explicitly indicate which provisions are derogated. As with Turkey and Ukraine, France
has also notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of several extensions of the
emergency situation.
The emergency measures authorized the French executive to impose house arrest without
judicial control and conduct property searches without a judicial warrant52 when there are serious
reasons to believe that a certain place is frequented by a person whose behavior constitutes a threat
to public safety and order.53 The exceptional powers, therefore, affected the application of several
provisions within the European Convention, including the rights to liberty, freedom of movement,
privacy, and freedoms of association and expression.54 With respect to Article 5 of the
45Id.
46REP. ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN UKRAINE, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS para. 17
(2016), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine15thReport.pdf.
47Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2, at 3.
48Id. Military and civil administrations may:
[S]et limits on remaining on the streets and in other public places within a period of 24 hours without specific
documents; to temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on the streets, roads and
terrain areas; to organize the checking of identification documents of individuals; and, if necessary, the searching of
personal belongings, vehicles, baggage and cargo, office premises and private dwellings of citizens . . . .
49Id.
50Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.
51Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency],
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350. For a detailed examination of the French
Emergency Law, see Rémi Barrue-Belou, Causes of Historical Precedents for Implementing the State of Emergency, 1 JOURNAL
DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (2016).
52Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency],
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350; France: New Emergency Powers Threaten
Rights. Parliament Should Ensure New Powers Not Misused, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2015/11/24/france-new-emergency-powers-threaten-rights.
53Administrative searches stopped in May 2016; see Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4. Nevertheless, searches have been
reintroduced with judicial review in July 2016.
54France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights. Parliament Should Ensure New Powers Not Misused, supra note 52.
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Convention, the emergency law granted the Minister of Interior the power to order the house
arrest of a person, in a place of the Minister’s choosing, if there are serious reasons to believe that
his behavior constitutes a threat to public security and public order.55 The emergency law did not
determine the maximum length of the house arrest that the Minister of Interior could impose
without any judicial oversight. It is only in December 2016—when France notified a further exten-
sion of the emergency status—that the length of house arrest was limited to a maximum of twelve
months.56 Furthermore, the Minister of Interior could extend the house arrest for an additional
three months with judicial authorization.57
In addition, French special measures restricted the application of Article 8 of the Convention.
The law on the state of emergency authorized administrative authorities to seize any computer
files they found and block websites without prior judicial review.58 Law No. 2015–1556
(November 30th) also extended the power of the government to collect, analyze, and store com-
munications content or metadata without requiring prior judicial review.59 Under Article 8 of the
law on the state of emergency, the Minister of the Interior may also order the closure of theaters,
drinking, and meeting places of any nature.
The French authorities notified the Council of Europe of their decision to extend the emer-
gency status until July 15, 2017.60 Nevertheless, despite the end of the application of Article
15, France adopted a new anti-terrorism bill that human rights organizations and community
groups promptly accused of normalizing the exercise of exceptional measures and thereby creating
a perpetual state of emergency.61 In particular, without any prior judicial authorization, the
Prefect, as the government’s representative, may close places of worship62 and can also create des-
ignated security zones where the police can stop and search persons and vehicles.63 In addition,
the Minister of Interior has the authority to limit the freedom of movement of every individual by
preventing any person from moving outside any specific geographical area, and designating his
place of residence.64
55Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency],
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.
56Eur. Consult. Ass., Notification de Déclaration, JJ8285C Tr./005-202 (Dec. 21, 2016) (providing France’s communication
to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe regarding the extension of the state of emergency that the French
government first declared in November 24, 2015).
57Id. See also Les assignations à résidence hors état d’urgence du projet de loi antiterroriste votées à l’Assemblée, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2017/09/27/les-assignations-a-residences-hors-etat-durgence-du-projet-
de-loi-antiterroriste-votees-a-lassemblee_a_23224161/.
58Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency],
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.
59Loi No. 2015-1556 du 30 novembre 2015 relative auxmesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationals
[Law No. 2015–1556 of November 30th, 2015 Relating to the Measures of Surveillance of the International Electronic Com-
munications], http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=998EACDA05B79BB46ECB1B480CC1846E.tpdila07v_2?
cidTexte=JORFTEXT000031549747&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCONT000031549744.
60See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 56 (“This is why the state of emergency was extended by Act No. 2016-1767 of
19 December 2016 extending the application of the Act No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 regarding the state of emergency until
15 July 2017”).
61Loi 2017–1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme [Law 2017-1510 of
October 30, 2017 Strengthening Domestic Security and the Fight Against Terrorism] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/
loi/2017/10/30/INTX1716370L/jo/texte. For a critical analysis of the new French Anti-Terrorism Law, see Erika
Asgeirsson, French Anti-terror Bill Threatens to Extend State of Emergency Abuses, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 2, 2017), https://
www.justsecurity.org/43771/french-anti-terror-bill-threatens-normalize-state-emergency/.
62Loi 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme [Law 2017-1510
of October 30, 2017 Strengthening Domestic Security and the Fight Against Terrorism] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/
loi/2017/10/30/INTX1716370L/jo/texte.
63Id. at art. 1.
64Id. at art. 3.
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The French Constitutional Court has stated that house arrest established in the new anti-
terrorism bill is in line with the Constitution.65 On the basis of emergency law, authorities placed
an applicant under house arrest for a period of two years. Then, despite the end of the state of emer-
gency, the applicant remained held under house arrest under the new anti-terrorism law. The appli-
cant complained about the lack of transitional arrangements in favor of persons who were already
under house arrest on the basis of the Law of 3 April 1955. The Court rejected the applicant’s claims,
which had highlighted similarities between the emergency legislation and the security laws entered
into force on November 1, 2017. The Court clarified that after the end of the state of emergency, the
measure could only be applied if: (i) Its purpose is the prevention of the commission of an act of
terrorism; (ii) the Minister of the Interior establishes that there are serious reasons to believe that
the person constitutes a threat to security and order public; and (iii) the suspect has relations with
terrorist organizations or adheres to their theses.66
III. Turkey
In July 2016, an attempted military coup in the Republic of Turkey and the subsequent response of
the government and President Erdoğan led to over 300 deaths and 2,000 injured people among
members of the military, police officers, and civilians.67 Following the failed coup, the government
detained thousands of soldiers and dismissed thousands of police officers, teachers, judges, and
prosecutors accused of being followers of the US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen—the alleged
mastermind of the failed coup.68 According to the Turkish authorities, the attempted coup
and its aftermath posed significant dangers to public security and constituted a threat to the life
of the nation.69 In the immediate aftermath, Turkey declared a state of emergency under article
120 of the Constitution and Law 2935 on State of Emergency.70 The Turkish Constitution enables
the Government to issue a law that establishes the state of emergency and further requires that the
recognition of a state of emergency be immediately brought before the Parliament for approval.71
The emergency measures adopted by the Turkish authorities significantly restrict the scope of
many guarantees of the Convention and ICCPR. One of the most significant provisions reducing
the applicability of the Convention is Article 6(1) of national Decree 667. This Article extended the
period of preventive detention up to 30 days, excluding the period of time required to bring the
suspect before a competent judicial authority.72 On January 23, 2017, Decree 684 reduced
the period of custody to seven days from the time of the arrest, again excluding the period of
time required to bring the suspect before a competent judicial authority.73
Turkey has also enacted significant limitations that affect the right to a fair trial under Article 6
of the Convention. Decree 667 establishes, inter alia, the possibility to record interviews and
65See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2017-691QPC, Feb. 16, 2018 (Fr.). The Court
decided to extend the period of time granted by the legislator to the person affected by the measure to challenge the house
arrest before the administrative court.
66Id. at para. 15.
67Lizzie Dearden, Turkey dismisses 7,400 more police, soldiers and public sector workers a year after failed coup,
INDEPENDENT (July 15, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-attempt-recep-tayyip-
erdogan-one-year-anniversary-7400-dismissed-gulen-purge-latest-a7842606.html.
68Turkey: Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/turkey (last
visited Dec. 28, 2018).
69See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.
70Id. The last communication of the notice of derogation for a further three months was submitted on January 19, 2018; see
Council of Europe, Notification of Declaration, JJ8592C Tr./005-217 (Jan. 19, 2018).
71See TURK. CONST. arts. 120–21.
72Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, (July 22, 2016) (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/
168069661d.
73See Decree Law No. 684 Dated 23 January 2017 on Specific Regulations Under the State of Emergency, art. 10 (Turk.),
https://rm.coe.int/16806fab6b.
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phone calls between a detainee and his or her defense counsel; the presence of officers during
interviews between a detainee and his or her lawyer in order to monitor the interview; the capacity
of judges to ban the detainee from consulting his or her lawyer; and the seizure of any documents
exchanged between a detainee and his or her lawyer.74
D. Military coup and special legislation: the Turkish derogation in European
jurisprudence
At the time of this writing, with regard to the three States that recently declared a state of emer-
gency, the ECHR has only examined those applications that concern the situation in Turkey.
Strasbourg judges have received complaints that detail alleged violations of the Convention that
occurred in the aftermath of the failed military coup. Thus far, the ECHR has scrutinized six
applications from Turkish nationals that concern the post-putsch emergency legislation. Four
complaints have been rejected under Article 35 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies prior to applying to the Strasbourg Court.75
In Mercan, a Turkish judge had been removed from her role and placed in preventive deten-
tion.76 She claimed that the conditions of her detention constituted a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention.77 She also argued that the Turkish authorities had breached Articles 5 and 6 of the
Convention because of the length of her preventive detention and the lack of evidence against
her.78 In the Zihni case, a schoolteacher had been fired and his passport had been suspended.79
The applicant alleged, inter alia, violations of his presumption of innocence under Article 6 and
the legality principle prohibiting the retroactive application of criminal norms under Article 7 of
the Convention.80
The ECHR found both cases inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies,81 noting
that the applicants should have appealed to the Turkish Constitutional Court before bringing their
cases to Strasbourg.82 In their unanimous decisions, the European judges referred to Article 148 of
the Turkish Constitution, as amended by Law no. 5982 in 2010, which provides that every indi-
vidual must first apply to the Constitutional Court “on the grounds that one of the fundamental
rights and freedoms within the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights which are
guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated by public authorities.”83 Moreover, the European
judges held that the applicants’ arguments were not sufficient to question the effectiveness of the
individual complaints before the Constitutional Court.84 The ECHR had previously rejected a
number of cases against Turkey, holding that the applicants had not availed themselves of the
possibility of applying to the Constitutional Court.85
74SeeDecree onMeasures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, art. 6(1)(d) (July 22, 2016) (Turk.), https://rm.
coe.int/168069661d.
75European judges have recently found that the fundamental rights of two Turkish individuals that were arrested after the
attempted coup were violated.
76Mercan v. Turkey, App. No. 56511/16 (Nov. 17, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
77Id. at para. 15.
78Id. at paras. 13–14, 16.
79Zihni v. Turkey, App No. 59061/16 (Dec. 8, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
80Id. at para. 18.
81See Mercan, App. No. 56511/16 at paras. 30–34; Zihni, App. No. 59061/16 at paras. 29–31.
82Mercan v. Turkey, App. No. 56511/16, paras. 26–27 (Nov. 17, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; and Zihni, App. No.
59061/16 at paras. 26–28.
83Mercan, App. No. 56511/16 at para. 21; Zihni, App No. 59061/16 at paras. 10, 11, 25.
84Zihni, App No. 59061/16 at para. 29.
85Özkan v. Turkey, App. No. 28745/11 (Oct. 1, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Leyla Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 58756/09
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Schmick v. Turkey, App. No. 25963/14 (Apr. 7, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/;
X v. Turkey, App. No. 61042/14 (May 19, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Duran v. Turkey, App. No. 79599/13 (May 19,
2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Berker and others v. Turkey, App. No. 54769/13 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
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The ECHR reached the same conclusion in the other two more recent cases. Ms. Catal was a
Turkish judge working at the Employment Court in Ankara who was arrested and placed in deten-
tion for four days.86 Nevertheless, criminal proceedings were not started against her. On August
26, 2016, Ms. Catal was one of 3,390 judges that the Supreme Judicial Council fired based on the
their alleged membership or affiliation with terrorist organizations involved in the coup.87 On the
basis of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that she did not have access
to a court and did not have an effective remedy before a national authority to assert her rights with
respect to her dismissal.88 The applicant also alleged that her dismissal constituted a breach of
Article 5 because of the length of her pre-trial detention, as well as a violation of her right to
an effective remedy because she had been unable to meaningfully challenge her continued
pre-trial detention.89 In addition, she claimed the revocation of her position as judge on the basis
of an alleged membership or affiliation with terrorist organizations, structures, or groups infringed
on her right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention.90 Nevertheless, the ECHR noted that the
recently adopted Decree-Law No. 685 of January 2, 2017, provided the possibility of appealing
directly to the Turkish High Court—the Council of State—regarding dismissals from public
roles.91 The ECHR rejected the applicant’s submissions in stating that the remedy introduced
by Legislative Decree No. 685 constituted an a priori accessible remedy that could have been used
by Ms. Catal prior to her submitting her application to the Strasbourg judges.92
Similarly, Mr. Koksal, a primary school teacher at the time of the military coup, was fired
because of his alleged membership in or links to terrorist organizations.93 The applicant argued
that his revocation breached, inter alia, Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention.94 In rejecting his com-
plaint, the Court highlighted that national Decree 685 had recently established a commission with
the competence to address appeals relating to emergency measures, including dismissals from
public positions.95 Therefore, the ECHR rejected the applicant’s submission because he had
not exhausted all accessible domestic remedies.96
In these four cases, the Strasbourg judges adopted a rather formalistic approach that has since
paved the way for the summary rejection of more than 27,000 applications.97 These applications,
mainly from journalists and judges, have been held inadmissible because the complainants had
not exhausted domestic remedies because they did not appeal to the Constitutional Court or to the
ad hoc Commission set up in January 2017.98 Scholarship has supported the Strasbourg judges’
strict formalistic stance on the subsidiary nature of the ECHR under Article 35(1) of the
Convention by emphasizing that domestic courts “must first be given the opportunity to examine
allegations of human rights violations.”99 Nevertheless, the ECHR’s conclusions of inadmissibility
do not appear very persuasive. European judges have ignored the fact that Turkish authorities
86Çatal v. Turkey, App. No. 2873/17 (Mar. 10, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
87Id. at para. 9. See also 543 More Judges, Prosecutors Dismissed in Coup Attempt Probe, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Sept. 1,
2016), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/543-more-judges-prosecutors-dismissed-in-coup-attempt-probe-103468.
88See Çatal, App. No. 2873/17 at para. 22.
89Id.
90Id.
91Id. at para. 28.
92Id.
93Koksal v. Turkey, App. No. 2873/17 (June 12, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
94Id. at para. 19.
95Id. at para. 29.
96Id. at para. 30.
97EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (2017), https://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2017_ENG.pdf.
98Id.
99Michael O’Boyle, Can the ECtHR Provide an Effective Remedy Following the Coup d’état and Declaration of Emergency in
Turkey?, EJILTALK (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-ecthr-provide-an-effective-remedy-following-the-coup-
detat-and-declaration-of-emergency-in-turkey/.
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have failed to ensure the impartiality of the judiciary during the state of emergency. This absence
of impartiality has combined with a more general climate of intimidation that has plagued the
judicial power’s work since the coup attempt.100 The ECHR has not taken into account the fact
that many judges not in line with the government have been dismissed. The same Constitutional
Court has dismissed two of its members without providing any evidence and solely on the basis of
“the information from the social circle,” and “the common conviction formed by the members of
the Constitutional Court.”101
In addition, exceptional measures in Turkey have not been subject to any judicial scrutiny by an
independent body. Indeed, in several cases discussed shortly after the attempted putsch, the same
Constitutional Court announced that it lacked the competence to determine whether the decree-
laws approved during the state of emergency are compatible with the Turkish Constitution.102
This decision reveals how the application of the Constitution has been de facto suspended in
Turkey. The same Constitutional Court has thus far been slow to examine the hundreds of thou-
sands of individual applications that have been filed since the submission of the derogation.103
Strasbourg judges have also stated that the appeal before the recently established national
Commission constitutes an effective remedy under the Convention.104 The ECHR has labeled
the Commission as an “excellent initiative.”105 Nonetheless, the European judges overlooked
the fact that the Commission is not a judicial body, and that its independence and impartiality
are highly questionable considering that the majority of its members—five out of seven—are
directly appointed by the government106 and that the Prime Minister may dismiss any member
of the Commission.107
The ECHR also neglected the narrow mandate of the same Commission. The Commission does
not have the competence to address all the emergency measures adopted or all types of violations
of fundamental rights caused by the implementation of the special legislation. Paradoxically, the
ECHR dismissed Koksal’s submission by establishing that the applicant should have appealed to
the Commission, despite the fact that the Commission had yet to become operational when the
case was decided.108
In declaring the inadmissibility of these cases, the European judges have also missed an impor-
tant opportunity to shed light on the existence itself of the state of emergency in Turkey, namely,
whether a threat to the life of the nation under Article 15 of the Convention continues to exist. The
ECHR avoided expressing its authoritative views on the proportionality and necessity of the
100Tuvan Gumrukcu & Gulsen Solaker, Turkey Dismisses 45 More Judges and Prosecutors in Post-Coup Probe, REUTERS (Apr.
3, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-judges/turkey-dismisses-45-more-judges-and-prosecutors-in-post-
coup-probe-aa-idUSKBN17523R.
101See DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN ITS PLENARY SITTING (August 4, 2016), http://www.
constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/press/PressReleases/detail/pdf/2016-12.pdf. See also, 2 Constitutional Court Judges
Arrested in Turkey, All Military Judges Suspended, RT (July 20, 2016), https://www.rt.com/news/352349-turkey-judges-
prosecutors-coup-crackdown/.
102See Zihni, App No. 59061/16 at para. 15.
103The Venice Commission has reported that individual applications to the Constitutional Court are not available to public
officials who have been dismissed under Emergency Decrees; in this regard, see generally Eur. Consult. Ass., Opinion on
Emergency Decree Laws Nos. 667–676 Adopted Following the Failed Coup of 15 July 2016, Opinion No. 865/2016 (July 15,
2016), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)037-e.
104See Koksal, App. No. 2873/17 at para. 29.
105See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 97, at 12.
106Three members are appointed by the Prime Minister from public officials, a member by the Minister of Justice from
judges and prosecutors in the Ministry of Justice, a member by the Minister of the Interior from the directors of the public
administration, and two members by the Superior Council of the Judiciary.
107See KEREM ALTIPARMAK, IS THE STATE OF EMERGENCY INQUIRY COMMISSION, ESTABLISHED BY EMERGENCY DECREE 685,
AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY? (Feb 23, 2017), http://www.ihop.org.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IS-THE-STATE-OF-
EMERGENCY-INQUIRY-COMMISSION.pdf.
108The Koksal decision was issued by the Court on June 12, 2017, while the rules of procedure of the Commission were
published on July 12, 2017 and the Commission could start to receive applications on July 17, 2017.
German Law Journal 57
widespread antiterrorist measures that have targeted, inter alia, a huge number of political oppo-
nents including judges, prosecutors, and academics. The Strasbourg decisions in these cases also
entail the risk of providing international legitimacy to measures that are allegedly targeting indi-
viduals that were not involved in the failed coup.109 The Council of Europe Commissioner argued
that the dismissal of judges and prosecutors had not been done on a case-by-case basis, but rather
that the “decisions included in their operative part only a universal, stereotypical and non-indi-
vidualised reasoning to which two [separate] lists of 2[,]845 and 543 names were simply
appended.”110 These dismissals have been labeled as arbitrary, unfair, and politically motivated.111
None of the individuals affected by this measure have been provided with any explanation of the
reason for their dismissal or any evidence of their alleged personal wrongdoing.112 Dismissal deci-
sions have only offered the vague and generalized motivation that “all the individuals listed in
them were ‘part of, connected to or in communication with a terrorist organization.’”113 Lack
of individualized justification makes any judicial review ineffective.
It is only as of March 20, 2018, that the ECHR found for the first time violations of the
Convention in cases related to the failed putsch. In particular, the Strasbourg judges held that
the imprisonment of two journalists for terrorism offenses constituted a breach of their right
to personal liberty and security under Article 5(1) and freedom of expression under Article 10
of the Convention.114 The European judgments followed decisions issued by the Turkish
Constitutional Court. Indeed, despite lacking the authority to scrutinize those exceptional mea-
sures that led to alleged breaches of human rights, the Constitutional Court accepted the appli-
cations of the two journalists for violation of the right to liberty and freedom of expression.115
Nevertheless, two first instance criminal courts refused to implement these decisions, holding that
the Constitutional Court exceeded its scope of competence when assessing the reason for the pre-
trial detention of the journalists.116 The lower courts argued that the Constitutional Court’s judg-
ments were not in compliance with the law and amounted to usurpation of power.117
Alpay and Altan thus constitute a welcome development in European jurisprudence, especially
in light of the strong climate of repression against journalists after the attempted coup.
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the ECHR adopted a very acritical and deferential
approach to the evaluation of the existence of the same state of emergency that provides domestic
authorities with a wide margin of discretion to assess the presence of the emergency and the nature
and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it.118 In line with its previous jurisprudence, the
ECHR held that “[t]he national authorities are in principle better placed than the international
judge to decide. .. on the presence of such an emergency : : : .”119 On the basis of this submissive
109VALENTINA RITA SCOTTI, IL GOLPE IN TURCHIA E LA CORTE EUROPEA DEI DRITTI UMANI: BREVI NOTE CRITICHE SULLE
DECISIONI DI IRRICEVIBILITÀ PER IL MANCATO PREVIO ESPERIMENTO DEI RINCORSI INTERNI (2017) https://www.osservatorioaic.
it/images/rivista/pdf/Scotti%20definitivo.pdf.
110MEMORANDUM ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEASURES TAKEN UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN
TURKEY para. 29 (Oct. 7, 2016), https://rm.coe.int/ref/CommDH(2016)35.




114Alpay v. Turkey, App. No. 16538/17 (Mar. 20, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; and Altan v. Turkey, App. No. 13237/17
(Mar. 20, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
115Massimo Frigo, The Constitutional Conflict in Turkey: Is There Still an Effective Remedy for Human Rights Violations?,
OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 26, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/01/26/the-constitutional-conflict-in-turkey-is-there-still-an-effective-
remedy-for-human-rights-violations/.
116See Başak Çalı, Will Legalism be the End of Constitutionalism in Turkey, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2018), https://
verfassungsblog.de/will-legalism-be-the-end-of-constitutionalism-in-turkey/.
117Id. See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 39.
118See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 75; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 91.
119See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 75; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 91.
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stance, the ECHR appears to share the views of Turkish authorities that, even after almost two
years, the failed coup continues to constitute a threat to the life and existence of the nation.120
Questionably, the ECHR also confirmed its formalistic interpretation of the exhaustion of
domestic remedies for admissibility purposes by explicitly stating that it “will not depart from
its previous finding that the right to lodge an individual application with the Constitutional
Court constitutes an effective remedy. : : : ”121 In this way, the Court appears to ignore the fact
that the refusal of lower courts to implement the Constitutional Court’s judgments strengthens
the perception of the poor effectiveness of domestic recourses in cases linked to the failed putsch.
The European judges overlook doubts over the existence of an effective domestic remedy for indi-
viduals that have been claiming a violation of their fundamental rights since the declaration of the
public emergency. In the interpretation and application of Article 35 of the Convention, European
jurisprudence has established that a national recourse must be “available and sufficient to afford
redress in respect of the breaches alleged.”122 According to the ECHR, in order to satisfy these
requirements of accessibility and effectiveness, domestic remedies must be sufficiently certain
not only in theory but also in practice.123 Considering the fearful judicial context of post-coup
Turkey where 4,238 judges have been ousted thus far, it is unclear to what extent an individual
complaint before the Turkish Constitutional Court or the Council of State may be certain and
effective in practice.124 Even a judge sitting in the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals has been arrested despite his diplomatic immunity granted by the United Nations.125
In previous decisions satisfying the admissibility test against Turkey, the ECHR had given sig-
nificant weight to the general legal and political context in which formal remedies operated. In
declaring cases admissible—despite domestic remedies not having been formally exhausted126—
the judges had held that “there may be special circumstances which absolve the applicant from the
obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies at his disposal : : : .”127 By contrast, the excessive for-
malism characterizing the Strasbourg approach to the recent cases related to the coup in Turkey
manifests itself as judicial neglect of the overall setting in which domestic judicial bodies assess
alleged violations of fundamental rights.
E. The common thread across current derogations from the European convention
Different security situations in France, Ukraine, and Turkey have prompted national authorities to
submit derogation to the Convention and the ICCPR. The Ukrainian state of emergency was
declared within the context of an armed conflict limited to specific regions of the country, while
in France the derogation was invoked in order to tackle the threat posed by fundamentalist reli-
gious groups. In Turkey, as discussed above, the adoption of special measures followed a failed
military coup that attempted to overthrow President Erdogan’s regime. Nevertheless, despite the
substantially dissimilar types of emergencies facing the national authorities, it is still possible to
identify certain common elements across these derogations.
The first common element among the three different derogations is the considerable length of
the state of emergency. None of these countries have found the initial three-month derogation
120See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at paras. 76–77; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at paras. 93–94 (Mar. 20, 2018).
121See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 121; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 142.
122Akdivar and others v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, para. 66 (Sept. 16, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Dalia v. France,
App. No. 154/1996/773/974, para. 38 (Feb. 19, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
123See Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93 at para. 66.
124Turkey Sacks 107 Judges, Prosecutors Over Links to Failed Coup, REUTERS (May 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-turkey-security-court/turkey-sacks-107-judges-prosecutors-over-links-to-failed-coup-media-idUSKBN1811P4.
125SCF, Turkish Court Releases UN Judge Arrested Over Alleged Gülen Links, STOCKHOLM CENTER FOR FREEDOM, (June 14,
2017), http://stockholmcf.org/turkish-court-releases-un-judge-arrested-over-alleged-gulen-links/.
126See, inter alia, Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93.
127Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93. at para. 67.
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period sufficient to face the public emergency: Each country extended their exceptional status
several times. At present—almost four years since the adoption of the emergency legislation—
Ukraine is still arguing for the necessity of using special measures approved at the beginning
of the armed conflict with Russia.128 Almost two years since the failed coup, Turkish authorities
have yet to show any intent to end the emergency. On January 19, 2018, Turkey notified the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe of its decision to extend the derogation from the
Convention for an additional three months.129 In France, the state of emergency has lasted exactly
two years, with the domestic authorities only having recently decided to end the use of the
derogation for counter-terrorism purposes.130
The recent emergencies in Ukraine, France, and Turkey led to a considerable increase of
powers in the hands of governments and the consequent restraint of individual freedoms and
liberties. This is not a sole peculiarity of these settings as crises are generally characterized by
a strengthening of the executive to the detriment of judicial authority and parliamentary over-
sight.131 One of the immediate consequences of emergencies is the absence of effective domestic
mechanisms of supervision of the executive. The three distinct features of public emergencies
classified by Fitzpatrick are the recurrent invasion of absolute rights, heavier limitations on other
fundamental rights, and concentration of power in the executive arm of the government.132
The second common element to the emergencies is in Ukraine, Turkey, and France is the sig-
nificant restriction on judicial oversight. In Ukraine and Turkey, special statutes eliminated the
power of the judicial body to authorize preventive detention lasting up to 30 days.133 In Turkey,
the judiciary has been subjected to a more direct attack as more than 4,000 judges have been fired
after the putsch.134 In Ukraine, a special regime of pre-trial investigation in relation to anti-
terrorist activities has been introduced, resulting in the transfer to prosecutors of the powers
normally attributed to investigating judges, including making decisions concerning custodial
measures, access to property, searches, and wiretapping.135 In France, the extraordinary laws
transferred the authority to impose a house arrest without any judicial review into the hands
of the government, initially for an unlimited period, then for a maximum of twelve months.136
Similarly, during the emergency, judicial control was not required in cases where the executive
power wished to collect, assess, and retain communications content or metadata.137
The use of administrative detention is also well-known within the contexts of crises, where
governments normally confer upon themselves the power to order detention without trial and
limit the access to judicial review. Closely linked to the weakening of the judiciary, the third
128The last extension of the derogation was submitted by Ukrainian authorities on February 3, 2017; see Eur. Consult. Ass.,
Notification of Declaration, JJ8218C Tr./005-205 (Feb. 3, 2017).
129Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.
130See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.
131See Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, Etat d’urgence et lutte contre le terrorisme. La mécanique de l’entropie, JOURNAL DU
DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (2016) http://www.journal-du-droit-administratif.fr/?p=447.
132JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF
EMERGENCY 19–31 (1994).
133Turkey has reduced the length of preventive detention without judicial control to seven days; see Eur. Consult. Ass.,
Notification of Declaration, JJ8338 Tr./005-206 (Mar. 6, 2017) (introducing Decree Law No. 684 on Specific Regulations under
the State of Emergency).
134Gumrukcu, supra note 100.
135Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2, at 3.
136Loi No. 55–385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [LawNo. 55–385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency], art.
11, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.
137Loi No. 2015-1556 du 30 novembre 2015 relative aux mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques interna-





common element to the emergencies in Ukraine, Turkey, and France includes the adoption of
measures that notably reduce the scope of applicability of the right to liberty under Article 5 of
the Convention. The overall purpose of this provision is to ensure that no one should be
deprived of his liberty in an “arbitrary fashion.”138 The ECHR stated that Article 5 addresses
“both the protection of physical liberty of the individuals as well as their personal security in a
context which, in the absence of safeguards, could result in a subversion of the rule of law and
place detainees beyond the reach of the most rudimentary forms of legal protection.”139 The
three different countries in question have significantly extended the length of preventive deten-
tion that lacks any judicial control. Indeed, the French measure of unlimited house arrest—
subsequently reduced to twelve months—constitutes a significant limitation of the guarantees
enshrined in Article 5 of the Convention. Similarly, even within the context of a recognized
state of emergency, the possibility of detaining a suspect for thirty days without judicial super-
vision in Ukraine and Turkey strongly conflicts with the protection afforded by the right to
liberty in the Convention.
Fourth, national requests for derogation from the Convention appear quite vague. This is
particularly true in relation to the notifications submitted by France and Turkey, which have
omitted to inform the Council of Europe about the fundamental rights that will be derogated
from. Consequently, both Turkish and French authorities do not clarify how limiting the
provisions of the Convention would be instrumental in tackling the terrorism threat and thus
safeguarding the life of the nation. The French communication only reported that the adoption
of the emergency measures was necessary to prevent the commission of future attacks.140 The
Turkish notification to the Council of Europe includes Decree Laws that only provide that the
exceptional measures are necessary within the scope of the attempted coup and fight against
terrorism.141 In both of these situations, only a reading of the adopted exceptional legislation
reveals which human rights are affected by the crisis. The Turkish Decree Laws provide a
significant deviation from the ordinary procedural guarantees found in both administrative
and criminal law. In particular, these measures limit several fundamental rights enshrined in
the Convention, including the rights to liberty, fair trial, privacy, family, freedom of expression,
and freedom of movement.142
F. A prognosis on the jurisprudence of the European Court?
Predicting the ECHR’s position regarding the recent declarations of public emergency would be a
hasty and speculative endeavor, especially considering that the ECHR has not, thus far, assessed
any cases related to the exceptional measures adopted by France and Ukraine, and only super-
ficially evaluated the validity of the Turkish derogation under Article 15 of the Convention.143
In addition, as argued by McDonald, “[t]he exact width of the margin of appreciation in any
particular case is difficult to specify in advance because it varies in accordance with the precise
balance of the principles that the Court thinks is appropriate in the case at hand.”144
138See inter alia, El Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 paras. 230–33 (Dec. 13, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/;
Guzzardi v. Italy, App. No. 7367/76, para. 92 (Nov. 6, 1980), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Amuur v. France, App. No.
19776/92, para. 42 (June 25, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
139Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276/94, para. 123 (May 25, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
140Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.
141Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.
142See Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, (July 22, 2016) (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/
168069661d.
143See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 72; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 88.
144Ronald St. John McDonald, The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in
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A forecast of the way in which the ECHR will deal with exceptional situations generally
constitutes a vain endeavor not only because emergencies are not all of the same type,145 but also
because European judges have rarely strived to define the exact content of the principle of “excep-
tional threat.”146 Whether and to what degree States can deviate from the protection of human
rights during public emergencies remains a case-specific inquiry.147 Ascertaining the existence of
the state of emergency and the necessity of adopted measures involves not only the evaluation of a
wide range of criteria, including the social context, but also a certain amount of political evalu-
ation. Similar emergency measures adopted in different contexts have been subject to a double
standard approach by European judges. Scholars have already examined how in the evaluation
of the exceptional threat to the life of the nation, the ECHR has implicitly made a distinction
between countries held to have a strong democratic tradition, as is the case with the UK, while
at the same time adopting a more rigorous approach in relation to other countries, like Greece and
Turkey.148
Nevertheless, without any intent to be exhaustive, it remains seemingly possible—on the basis
of previous European jurisprudence—to provide some general reflections on the potential weight
of some of the elements characterizing the recent derogations before the ECHR. In light of the
strong effect that exceptional measures have on the protection of fundamental rights, it seems
highly probable that the ECHR will receive several applications against the countries that have
derogated from the European Convention since 2015. The likelihood that the ECHR will receive
many complaints connected to the emergencies may also increase as the special legislation in the
states of emergency reaches more widespread application. At the time of this writing, the ECHR
has approximately 26,000 outstanding applications related to the state of emergency in Turkey.149
Under Article 15 of the Convention, the Strasbourg judges will be called to ascertain the exist-
ence of a state of emergency. This study has already investigated how the ECHR has always
recognized a wide margin of discretion for States evaluating the existence of a state of emergency.
The delegation of such authority to contracting States constitutes a consolidated practice in
Strasbourg case law.150 This submissive approach has also been confirmed in the Alpay and
Altan cases against Turkey.151 Therefore, thus far, European case law has not shown any intent
to revise the generous margin of discretion afforded to States in the evaluation of the public emer-
gency. In the application of such a margin of discretion, the ECHR has also accepted government
submissions on emergencies in situations that lack any violent acts. The ECHR has indeed
acknowledged that the mere threat of serious terrorist attacks could justify a derogation from
the Convention.152 European judges clearly emphasized that “[t]he requirement of imminence
cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking
measures to deal with it.”153 With respect to the disturbances between the security forces and the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in south-east Turkey, the ECHR accepted national authorities’
submissions on the presence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.154 It reiter-
ated that it is within the competences of contracting States to establish whether the life of the
145Gross & Nì Aolain, supra note 24, at 636.
146Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 230, 240 (1996).
147Evan Criddle, Protecting Human Rights During Emergencies: Delegation, Derogation and Deference, 45 NETHERLANDS
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 197, 206 (2014).
148Gross & Nì Aolain, supra note 24, at 285–86. See also Loof, supra note 14, at 708–09.
149See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 97, at 8.
150See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at para. 43; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 68; Demir and
others, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064 at para. 43; Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207.
151See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 75; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 91.
152A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 177.
153Id. at para. 177.
154Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at paras. 69–70.
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nation has been threatened by a “public emergency.”155 In light of this consolidated, quasi-
abdication of the evaluation of the public crisis to States, it seems unlikely that the ECHR would
take on the responsibility of questioning whether a state of emergency actually threatens the life of
the nation in the three different scenarios or in any future case.
Similarly, European jurisprudence does not seem to give weight to claims concerning the vague
nature of the derogation notification to the Council of Europe. Under Article 15(3), contracting
States have to “keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor.”156 This procedural condition imposes upon High
Contracting Parties to the Convention the simple obligation to inform the Council of Europe
about the nature of the measures taken. Therefore, unlike the ICCPR and the American
Convention on Human Rights which impose upon governments a requirement to specify the
provisions of the respective treaties they want to derogate, the Convention does not require
contracting States to clarify which Articles of the Convention they intend to derogate from. In
the Lawless case, the Commission admitted the adequateness of the Irish notification of deroga-
tion from the Convention despite the government’s letter to the Council of Europe which did not
provide a detailed account of the reasons.157 Specifically, the letter did not include what had led the
domestic authorities to take the measures of derogation or what Convention provisions were being
derogated from.158 The Commission also found that the letter was a sufficient notification for the
purposes of Article 15 despite not having the character of a notice of derogation and not having
been submitted by the government for the purpose of registering a formal notice of derogation.159
In the Alpay and Altan cases, the ECHR found that the procedural condition required by Article
15(3) was satisfied even though the Turkish derogation simply stated that “measures taken may
involve derogation from the obligations under the Convention” without explicitly mentioning
which Articles of the Convention would form the subject of the derogation.160
In Turkey, Ukraine, and France, where the derogation has been extended several times, a con-
crete risk of a prolonged state of emergency exists. The ECHR may be called to ascertain whether
the requirements under Article 15 are satisfied during the entire period in which the State decides
to maintain the emergency situation. The duration of the state of emergency is one of the factors
that the ECHR takes into account in the evaluation of the necessity of the special measures.161
Nevertheless, the significant length of the state of emergency may not constitute per se a ground
for the ECHR to deprive the derogation of its validity. This notion is confirmed by the Ireland v.
UK case where the ECHR held that the British derogation did not breach the Convention
notwithstanding the emergency state lasting for more than five years—from August 1971 until
December 1975.162 The ECHR stated that in light of “the longest and most violent terrorist
campaign witnessed in either part of the island of Ireland,”163 the extrajudicial powers of arrest,
detention, and internment exercised by the British authorities did not amount to a breach of the
Convention.164 Further, in the A. and others case, the ECHR clarified that the Human Rights
Committee’s position that derogation from the ICCPR be “exceptional and temporary” is not
a requirement under Article 15 of the Convention.165 Accordingly, as the cases of the UK and
Turkey demonstrate, a public emergency lasting for many years can be compatible with
155Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207.
156Convention art. 15(3).
157See Lawless, App. No. 332/57 at para. 47.
158Id.
159Id. at para. 44-47.
160See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 73 (emphasis added); Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 89 (emphasis added).
161See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at para. 43.
162See Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 11.
163Id.
164Id. at para. 243.
165A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 178.
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Article 15 of the Convention. In the Marshall case, the ECHR held that detaining the applicant
without judicial intervention in 1998 on the basis of a derogation submitted by British authorities
ten years prior did not amount to a breach of Article 5.166
Article 15 also requires that emergency measures be strictly necessary to address the exigencies
of the situation. In relation to the crises in Turkey and France, the substantive condition of estab-
lishing a proportionality test for the special legislation could play a key role in future European
jurisprudence that may result from the widespread application of Turkish and French special laws.
In Turkey, domestic institutions have enacted emergency decrees that significantly limit the
fundamental rights of any person who is a member of, affiliated with, otherwise connected to,
or in any way in contact with terrorist organizations or structures, organizations, or groups that
the National Security Council has identified as carrying out activities against the national security
of the State.167 On the basis of such a remote requirement like mere contact with the alleged
terrorist organization, the exceptional regime has been used against individuals who were barely
involved with planning, executing, or contributing to the putsch in any form. Therefore, the
measures have been applied to dismiss a substantial number of individuals from public service
through a process that lacks any procedural requirements. Reports indicate that the emergency
measures have significantly targeted political opponents of the governments and that the govern-
ment has exploited the emergency state to close televisions and newspapers.168 It is further
estimated that, as of May 2017, Turkey fired about 145,000 civil servants, security personnel,
and academics.169 Associations, schools, and universities have been closed and their assets seized
by the State.170 Human Rights Watch reported that there were 144 journalists in pre-trial deten-
tion as of November 2016 because of their writing and journalistic activity.171 The same NGO also
stated that many reporters and columnists accused of being linked to Gülen were arrested without
evidence.172 According to Amnesty International, Turkish authorities have arbitrarily detained
thousands of people with no involvement in the coup attempt.173
Turkey has not only applied emergency laws to individuals accused of being connected to Gülen
organization, which the Government identified as the association behind the coup, but also to indi-
viduals like journalists and writers accused of having contact with an organization—the PKK—but
no links to the coup. Several journalists have been arrested merely for taking part in a solidarity
campaign with a pro-Kurdish newspaper (Özgür Gündem) that had been closed down by domestic
authorities.174 Lecturers have been dismissed simply because they had signed a petition for
the peaceful solution to the conflict with the Kurdish movement; similarly, the government has
suspended the activities of 370 NGOs, including three lawyers’ associations with a human rights
focus, andwomen’s rights and humanitarian organizations in the southeast.175 The government has
also applied emergency legislation to 10,000 teachers, terminating their employment because of
their participation in a strike organized by a lawfully established trade union.176
166Marshall v. UK, App. No. 41571/98 (July 10, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
167See, inter alia, Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, art. 5 (July 22, 2016) (Turk.),
https://rm.coe.int/168069661d.
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humanrightsturkey.org/2017/06/21/amnesty-international-usa-board-writes-to-secretary-of-state/.
174Turkey: Events of 2016, supra note 68.
175Id.
176ASYLUM RESEARCH CONSULTANCY, TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT–UPDATE 177 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.ecoi.net/en/
file/local/1325304/1226_1486117831_5890c8d84.pdf.
64 Triestino Mariniello
France has also made wide use of the emergency laws, applying them to situations that go
beyond efforts to tackle the alleged terrorist threat. Similar to the Turkish situation, the law
on the state of emergency presents a broad scope of application because it refers to “any person
in respect of whom there are serious reasons to believe that his behavior constitutes a threat to
public safety and order.”177 As previously emphasized, the ambiguous and indefinite concept of
“serious reasons to believe” not only heralds legal uncertainty, but also paves the way for arbitrary
and politically-targeted implementation of the special laws.178 Domestic authorities have used
exceptional legislation against climate activists accused of flouting a ban on organizing protests
during the week after the Paris climate summit.179 Similarly, the state of emergency has also been
invoked to impede activists that demonstrate against the government’s labor reform, to evict
squatters, to apprehend suspected drug traffickers, and to question irregular migrants.180
Quantitative data also confirms the widespread reliance on special legislation. It has been reported
that since the declaration of the emergency status, 752 people have been placed under house arrest
for an average of 266 days per individual, while 4,457 houses were raided by police using emer-
gency powers and without authorization by a judge.181 Human Rights Watch reported that of the
3,600 house searches carried out in the first seven months since the declaration of the emergency,
only six resulted in terrorism-related criminal proceedings.182
G. State of emergency and preventive detention
In the near future, the emergency laws and their widespread implementation, particularly in
France and Turkey, may lead to a rapid and substantial increase in applications related to viola-
tions of Article 5 of the Convention. Indeed, the restriction of the right to liberty within a context
of crisis is not novel. As evidenced by the ECHR’s practice concerning previous exceptional
contexts, fundamental rights in ‘criminal’ proceedings are generally the first sacrificial victims
on the altar of a public emergency. This is particularly true in relation to Article 5 of the
Convention, whose derogation is generally seen by governments as a necessary tool to protect
the life and security of the nation under threat.183 Since the establishment of the European
Commission of Human Rights, the UK and Turkey have made frequent use of administrative
detention to confront public emergencies. In the Ireland v. UK case, the Irish government stated
that the British extrajudicial measures of deprivation of liberty constituted a breach of Article 5 of
the Convention.184 In regard to the emergency situation in Turkey in the aftermath of the clashes
between the government and members of the Kurdistan’s Workers Party in 1990, there have been
177See Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency],
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.
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different cases before the ECHR concerning the detention of suspects without judicial oversight.185
Similarly, with regard to the derogations during 1957–1962 and 1976–1977, the Republic of
Ireland notified the Council of Europe of exceptional measures that mainly included detention
without trial.186
The ECHR’s acceptance of the existence of public emergencies does not mean that domestic
authorities enjoy unlimited discretion in the limitation of personal liberty. Detention without trial
for up to thirty days in Ukraine and Turkey187 or unlimited house arrest in France188 would still be
subject to the ECHR scrutinizing whether the States have acted in a manner that exceeds the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the crisis. When a valid derogation has been submitted,
domestic authorities may hold suspects without judicial intervention for a longer period or on a
lower standard of proof than would be expected in a time of normalcy. Nevertheless, individuals
still retain their right to challenge the lawfulness of detention.189 The United Nations Human
Rights Committee considers the right to a prompt judicial review of the lawfulness of detention
to be non-derogable,190 as required to protect rights explicitly designated as non-derogable.191
Accordingly, deprivation of liberty must not, even in the event of a public emergency and a valid
derogation from Article 9, be “unreasonable or unnecessary under the circumstances.”192 The
ECHR could be called to assess the proportionality of these measures on a case-by-case basis
by taking into account all the relevant factors. Even within an emergency, prolonged preventive
detention without judicial control should be examined in relation to Article 5(3) of the
Convention. This provision requires that “everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of. .. this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power : : : .”193
The ECHR has clarified that within an ordinary context, the requirement of promptness
imposes a maximum of four days.194 This limit has been applied by the ECHR to cases dealing
with terrorist offenses where no derogation has been submitted by the State.195 Indeed, with regard
to the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, the ECHR concluded that even a detention of four days
and six hours without judicial control under such circumstances violated Article 5 of the
Convention.196 By contrast, within the same situation, in another case—the Brannigan and
185See Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93; Demir and others, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064; Nuray Şen, App. No. 41478/98
at para; Bilen, App. No. 34482/97 .
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72–74; 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 32; 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.)
24-28; 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 18; 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 22.
187As discussed above, Turkey has reduced detention without judicial control to up to seven days. See Decree Law No. 684
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McBride case—on the basis of the valid derogation submitted by the UK, the ECHR found that the
detention of seven days without judicial intervention did not amount to a violation of the
Convention because it was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.197
Nevertheless, European jurisprudence finding that Turkish authorities had violated Article 5 by
administrative detention within the ambit of a valid emergency198 could constitute a set of
evaluative principles for future cases dealing with preventive detention in the recent derogation
contexts. The ECHR held that the particular problems linked to the investigation of terrorist
offenses “cannot absolve the authorities from the obligation to bring any person arrested in accor-
dance with Article 5 § 1 (c) ‘promptly’ before a judge : : : .”199 Therefore, in the Nuray Sen case, the
ECHR concluded that, despite the validity of the state of emergency, the detention of the applicant
in police custody for eleven days without any judicial intervention was a breach of Article 5(3) of
the Convention.200 Similarly, in the Aksoy case, the ECHR found that the state of emergency could
not justify an incommunicado detention for fourteen days.201 The Strasbourg judges held that the
exceptionally long period of detention without judicial intervention was not necessary to meet the
exigencies of the situation and also left the applicant vulnerable to acts of torture.202
This jurisprudence shows the significance of Article 5 in providing guarantees against the arbi-
trary limitation of personal liberty even when a valid emergency exists. Accordingly, it is difficult
to reconcile the implementation of the Ukrainian and Turkish special legislation on preventive
detention of thirty days, without judicial intervention, with the protection afforded by Article
5. It is true that Turkey has enacted more recent legislation establishing a maximum of seven days
for incommunicado detention. Nevertheless, a number of cases exceeding the seven-day detention
without judicial control have been reported after the adoption of the new law.203 Further breaches
of Articles 5 and 10 of the Convention will most likely result from the several outstanding appli-
cations submitted by journalists who have been imprisoned by Turkish authorities after the coup.
Violations of Article 5 could also arise from the implementation of French law regarding the
special measure of house arrest. In the past, the ECHR has indeed stated that even house arrest
would amount to a deprivation of the personal liberty for the purposes of Article 5(1)(c) of the
Convention.204
H. Conclusion
States of emergency pose the most significant challenges to the safeguarding of fundamental rights
and civil liberties. The policies adopted by Ukraine, France, and Turkey risk undermining the
foundations of a democratic State that is based on the rule of law and separation of powers.
Such risk is perhaps best evidenced by the substantial weakening of the judiciary during the
emergency in the three countries in question. The significant increase in the discretionary margin
of the police, combined with the marginalization of the judiciary, reveals how the state of security
created to face the crisis presents features of a police State.205 The gradual replacement of the
judicial role with police operations represents a symptom of how prolonged emergencies prompt
197Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89, at para. 52–4.
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the eclipse of legal certainty and lead to the rapid and irreversible degradation of public
institutions.206
The recent derogations submitted by Ukraine, France, and Turkey, together with the excep-
tional measures adopted for counter-terrorism purposes, substantially restrict several fundamen-
tal rights enshrined in the Convention. The shift and concentration of authority and power away
from the judiciary into the government’s hands constitutes a direct and profound attack upon the
central values of the Convention. In particular, preventive detention measures, with the suspen-
sion of habeas corpus otherwise approved by the three States, not only enable police forces to use
arbitrary and unlimited use of force—jus puniendi—but also seriously affect the protection of
absolute and non-derogable rights like the prohibition of torture and inhumane or degrading
treatment under Article 3 of the Convention. Indeed, the right to have detention subject to review
must be read in the light of the essential prohibitions on arbitrary detention and ill-treatment.207
In this context, judicial review constitutes the procedural avenue that incorporates the remedy of
habeas corpus, which represents a fundamental protection of the right to liberty and the right to
physical integrity. Thus, the reviewing body must play a twofold role. First, the designated body
must determine the lawfulness of internment. Such confinement may only continue if a reviewing
body, upon periodical and individualized review of detention, is satisfied that the State provided
appropriate justification for the individual to be kept in detention.208 Second, the reviewing body,
through habeas corpus, “performs a vital role in ensuring that a person’s life and physical integrity
are respected, in preventing his disappearance or the keeping of his whereabouts secret and in
protecting him against torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment or treat-
ment.”209 In this context, the right of detainees to appear in person before a court is central to
prevent or ascertain the occurrence of torture or ill-treatment.210
As the recent emergency laws and their widespread and apparently indiscriminate implemen-
tation present the risk of destabilizing the whole European system of protection, it becomes ever
more necessary that the ECHR adopt a more rigorous and principled scrutiny of the derogation
conditions under Article 15 of the Convention. Unfortunately, thus far, the ECHR has almost
completely abdicated the authority to evaluate the existence of a public emergency under the der-
ogation clause to national governments. By relying on the unproven axiom that States are better
placed to decide on the presence of an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations
necessary to avert it, European judges have adopted a deferential approach that has left the dis-
cretion to interpret Article 15 of the Convention to national authorities. In this context, rather
than striking an appropriate balance between national interests and the protection of human
rights, the ECHR has appeared more inclined to privilege national security over the safeguarding
of fundamental guarantees. To date, the Greek situation in the 1960s constitutes the only case
where the ECHR decided to put aside this interpretative posture and intervened in the evaluation
of the existence of the state of emergency.211 The Strasbourg Court’s uncritical attitude towards
derogation conditions presents an image of a court that has renounced its role as guardian of the
fundamental individual safeguards enshrined in the Convention. This “judicial passivism” might
also lead to a weakening of human rights standards in all of the contracting States of the Council of
Europe, which may in turn further tempt other countries to suspend the Convention when
confronting an alleged terrorist threat.
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Strasbourg’s most recent cases against Turkey seemingly confirm that European judges are far
from moving beyond the detached attitude with respect to whether to evaluate the validity of an
emergency state and the special measures adopted by national authorities. The ECHR’s departure
from its previous jurisprudence on Article 15 would provide meaningful supervision of funda-
mental rights in contexts where they are most at risk. If the ECHR is called to assess applications
concerning violations of fundamental rights that allegedly occurred during the states of emergency
in Ukraine, France, and Turkey, a truly effective supervisory role would first require that the
ECHR reaffirm itself as the primary judge on Article 15 conditions, moving beyond the overly
generous margin of discretion given to contracting States. Scholars have already persuasively
argued how the deferential approach of the ECHR reflected in the margin of discretion has
led European judges to accept—without sufficient independent scrutiny—a government’s sub-
missions.212 With regard to future applications linked to the Ukrainian, French, and Turkish
situations, further delegating to States the interpretation of Article 15 conditions, under a broad
grant of discretion, would confirm the ECHR’s reluctance to establish clear and objective criteria
for derogation in the event of an exceptional threat. Reliance on a wide margin of discretion would
also further evidence the ECHR’s abdication of its responsibility to deal with difficult and intricate
cases.213 By contrast, in determining the presence of a public emergency and the scope of the
derogation required to avert it, stricter scrutiny of the requirements under Article 15 would
enhance the ECHR’s authority vis-à-vis domestic authorities. In so doing, by claiming its com-
petence over the primary assessment of the existence of an emergency and special laws adopted by
States, the ECHR would also represent to governments that national interests may be safeguarded
through less radical and non-emotional measures that do not require drastic derogations from the
Convention.
A substantive scrutiny of the conditions for the derogation from the Convention obligations
would also require a more critical approach towards the length of the state of emergency. Despite
prolonged crises presenting the greatest threats to the protection of fundamental rights in the
ECHR’s jurisprudence, a long-lasting emergency does not automatically deprive a derogation
of its validity. The ECHR has argued that the duration of the state of emergency is only one
of the factors that it takes into account in the evaluation of the necessity of the special measures.214
Nevertheless, in determining the conditions under Article 15, it has not given excessive weight to
long-term crises. European judges have considered significantly long-lasting emergencies in both
the UK and Turkey to fall in line with the requirements of the derogation clause.215 In theMarshall
case, the ECHR found that the detention of the applicant without judicial intervention in 1998 was
not a breach of Article 5 because British authorities had submitted a derogation ten years before.216
This study has shown how one of the common elements to the situations in Turkey, Ukraine, and
France, is that derogations have been renewed several times. Ukraine has indeed not shown any
intent to end the emergency, which started four years ago. On January 19, 2018, Turkey notified
the Council of Europe of an additional three-month extension of the emergency, which began in
2016. With regard to the situation in Turkey after the failed coup, the Venice Commission high-
lighted the risk of a “permanentisation” of those special measures that have a strong effect on the
protection of fundamental rights.217 In France, despite the public emergency ending after two
years, the recently adopted counter terrorism measures present a risk of normalizing the state
of emergency. Avoiding the paradoxical existence of quasi-permanent states of emergency218
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requires a stricter approach to the derogation clause that would prevent national authorities from
abusing their faculty to suspend human rights norms while simultaneously emphasizing that an
emergency should only be temporary and limited.
Another note concerns the procedural condition of the notification to the Council of Europe.
French and Turkish derogations appear extremely vague, as they avoid informing the Council of
Europe about the fundamental rights to be derogated and why the adopted special measures are
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. As evidenced by the widespread application of
exceptional measures in both Turkey and France, overly broad derogations constitute a carte
blanche for the executive power to vest itself with a huge discretionary authority in the limitation
of fundamental rights.219 Nevertheless, the vagueness of a derogation submission does not appear
to have any relevance before the European Commission of Human Rights and the ECHR. The
same Commission found that the letter from Irish authorities was a sufficient notification for
the purposes of Article 15 although it did not have the character of a notice of derogation and
had not been submitted by the government for the purpose of registering a formal notice of
derogation. On the contrary, only detailed and exhaustive communications of the special
measures, a clear indication of the reasons why those measures are necessary to tackle the public
emergency, and a list of the fundamental rights affected by the exceptional legislation may ensure
meticulous oversight by the European judicial body.
Finally, an effective supervision in a context of crisis should entail that the ECHR reviews its
formalistic approach to ascertain an admissibility requirement, notably, the exhaustion of all
domestic remedies. On the basis of this strict interpretation of the subsidiary nature of the
ECHR, European judges rejected more than 27,000 applications related to the Turkish coup.
The main reason behind the ECHR’s conservative interpretation of Article 35 appears to be
the intent to significantly reduce the overwhelming number of pending cases.220 In addition, it
should not be overlooked that the massive character of this rejection is politically motivated,
as these decisions seemingly constitute a concession to strong pressures from contracting
States that are reluctant to accept Strasbourg’s interference, particularly in a situation of emer-
gency. Indeed, the Strasbourg position underestimates the difficult context in which the judicial
power has been working since the coup attempt. These decisions further overlook the fact that
after almost two years of a state of emergency in Turkey, there has been a systematic failure
to provide effective domestic remedies to individuals affected by special measures that are free
from any judicial review.
In interpreting Article 35 of the Convention, the European jurisprudence has established that a
national recourse must be “available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches
alleged.”221 Domestic remedies, according to the ECHR, must be sufficiently certain not only
in theory, but also in practice, in order to satisfy the requisite accessibility and effectiveness.222
Nevertheless, such an interpretation of Article 35 risks being a purely rhetorical exercise in
situations of emergency if the ECHR does not halt its overall disengagement. In contrast, an
appropriate interpretative position would give proper weight to the context in which judicial
or quasi-judicial bodies must assess alleged violations of fundamental rights. The ECHR cannot
rely on an interpretation of Article 35 that is confined to ascertaining whether there are domestic
recourses for the applicant without strictly addressing the key question of whether and to what
extent these remedies are effective. The Turkish context confirms that in an emergency, domestic
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courts are unwilling and/or unable to ensure effective oversight of special measures that
significantly affect the protection of fundamental rights and civil liberties. During crises, domestic
judges may even have a complacent attitude towards a government’s discretionary exercise of
power.
Therefore, to conclude, in evaluating the accessibility and effectiveness of domestic remedies,
Strasbourg judges should take into account the general legal and political contexts, particularly,
whether judicial bodies work in a climate of intimidation and political pressure that prevents them
from examining individual complaints in an independent and impartial way. In light of the
fragility of the domestic judiciary, Strasbourg may constitute the only counter-power capable
of limiting abuses by the State perpetrated under the umbrella of national security.
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